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- lowVerbose GraphQL errors name internal fieldsshows what to look for
- mediumIntrospection reveals an exportInvoices mutation the UI never callsgives a way in
- mediumThe mutation checks the session, not the tenantnothing stops it
- criticalAny signed-in user can export another tenant’s invoices
- lowSign-up accepts addresses nobody has verifiedlets anyone claim an email
- mediumSSO links accounts by email address alonejoins the two accounts
- mediumExisting sessions survive the SSO linkkeeps the attacker logged in
- criticalRegistering a colleague’s email first takes over their SSO account
- lowA forgotten staging host still resolvesis reachable from outside
- mediumIts debug route prints the environmentleaks the keys
- mediumStaging runs with production storage keysthe keys are not scoped
- criticalWrite access to the production file store
Pentest Report
Acme Payments GmbH · Jan 1, 2026
- Scope
- 14 applications, 3 APIs
- Method
- Continuous, agentic
- Open critical
- 0
superhack#payments-team
Critical Tenant export without ownership check
Assigned to @payments-team · evidence attached
Retest runs on its own after your fix.
PAY-318Payments
Critical Tenant export without ownership check
DoneRoot cause and patch location inside
Retested after deploy. Fix holds.
SEC-1042Security
High Write access to the file store
ReopenedPlatform team
Retested: still exploitable. Reopened.
Summarize the last superhack run.
● superhack · get_context
Finished this morning: 412 assets, 6 new findings. One critical: SH-292, any signed-in user can export another tenant’s invoices. Retests: 3 fixed, SH-271 still exploitable.
What’s a short-term fix for SH-292?
● superhack · get_finding
Until the ownership check ships, block exportInvoices at the gateway when the tenantId differs from the session’s. One rule, no deploy. Then ask superhack to retest.
Why now
Your company ships at agentic pace — the attack surface changes with it. Staying secure now takes two things at once.
Code is generated as often as it is written, and not only by engineers: an automated workflow in finance, two connected tools in support, an internal app built in an afternoon. Each adds something reachable from outside. A pentest or a red team was never going to find all of it, and nobody can run one every week. At a few thousand endpoints, non-agentic testing stops being a method.
Necessity 1Cadence
Every change tested, every fix verified.
Necessity 2Quality
Full depth, at scale.
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